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Abstract
While real-world decisions involve many competing objectives, algorithmic decisions are often evaluated
with a single objective function. In this paper, we study algorithmic policies which explicitly trade off
between a private objective (such as profit) and a public objective (such as social welfare). We analyze a
natural class of policies which trace an empirical Pareto frontier based on learned scores, and focus on
how such decisions can be made in noisy or data-limited regimes. Our theoretical results characterize
the optimal strategies in this class, bound the Pareto errors due to inaccuracies in the scores, and show
an equivalence between optimal strategies and a rich class of fairness-constrained profit-maximizing
policies. We then present empirical results in two different contexts — online content recommendation
and sustainable abalone fisheries — to underscore the applicability of our approach to a wide range
of practical decisions. Taken together, these results shed light on inherent trade-offs in using machine
learning for decisions that impact social welfare.
1 Introduction
From medical diagnosis and criminal justice to financial loans and humanitarian aid, consequential decisions
increasingly rely on data-driven algorithms. Machine learning algorithms used in these contexts are mostly
trained to optimize a single metric of performance. As a result, the decisions made by such algorithms can
have unintended adverse side effects: profit-maximizing loans can have detrimental effects on borrowers Skiba
& Tobacman (2009) and fake news can undermine democratic institutions Persily (2017).
The field of fair machine learning proposes algorithmic approaches that mitigate the adverse effects of
single objective maximization. Thus far it has predominantly done so by defining various fairness criteria
that an algorithm ought to satisfy (see e.g., Barocas et al., 2019, and references therein). However, a growing
literature highlights the inability of any one fairness definition to solve more general concerns of social
equity Corbett-Davies & Goel (2018). The impossibility of satisfying all desirable criteria Kleinberg et al.
(2017) and the unintended consequences of enforcing parity constraints based on sensitive attributes Kearns
et al. (2018) indicate that existing fairness solutions are not a panacea for these adverse effects. Recent
work (Liu et al., 2018; Hu & Chen, 2020) contend that while social welfare is of primary concern in many
applications, common fairness constraints may be at odds with the relevant notion of welfare.
In this paper, we consider welfare-aware machine learning as an inherently multi-objective problem that
requires explicitly balancing multiple objectives and outcomes. A central challenge is that certain objectives,
like welfare, may be harder to measure than others. Building on the traditional notion of Pareto optimality,
which provides a characterization of optimal policies under complete information, we develop methods to
balance multiple objectives when those objectives are measured or predicted with error.
We study a natural class of selection policies that balance multiple objectives (e.g., private profit and
public welfare) when each individual has predicted scores for each objective (e.g., their predicted contribution
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to total welfare and profit). We show that this class of score-based policies has a natural connection to
statistical parity constrained classifiers and their -fair analogs. In the likely case where scores are imperfect
predictors, we bound the sub-optimality of the multi-objective utility as a function of the estimator errors.
Simulation experiments highlight characteristics of problem settings (e.g. correlation of the true scores) that
affect the extent to which we can jointly maximize multiple objectives.
We apply the multi-objective framework to data from two diverse decision-making settings. We first
consider an ecological setting of sustainable fishing, where we study score degradation to mimic certain
dimensions being costly or impossible to measure. Our second empirical study uses existing data on the
popularity and ‘social health’ of roughly 40,000 videos promoted by YouTube’s recommendation algorithm,
and shows that multi-objective optimization could produce substantial increases in average video quality for
almost negligible reductions in user engagement.
In summary, we provide a characterization, theoretical analysis, and empirical study of a score-based
multi-objective optimization framework for learning welfare-aware policies. We hope that our framework
may help decouple the complex problem of defining and measuring welfare, which has been studied at length
in the social sciences, e.g. Deaton (2016), from a machine toolkit geared towards optimizing it.
2 Related Work
2.1 Fair and Welfare-Aware Machine Learning
The growing subfield of fairness in machine learning has investigated the implementation and implications
of machine learning algorithms that satisfy definitions of fairness (Dwork et al., 2012; Barocas & Selbst,
2016; Barocas et al., 2019). Machine learning systems in general cannot satisfy multiple definitions of group
fairness (Chouldechova, 2017; Kleinberg et al., 2017), and there are inherent limitations to using observational
criteria (Kilbertus et al., 2017). Alternative notions of fairness more directly encode specific trade-offs between
separate objectives, such as per-group accuracies (Kim et al., 2019) and overall accuracy versus a continuous
fairness score Zliobaite (2015). These fairness strategies represent trade-offs with domain specific implications,
for example in tax policy (Fleurbaey & Maniquet, 2018) or targeted poverty prediction (Noriega et al., 2018).
An emerging line of work is concerned with the long-term impact of algorithmic decisions on societal
welfare and fairness (Ensign et al., 2018; Hu & Chen, 2018; Mouzannar et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2020). Liu
et al. (2018) investigated the potentially harmful delayed impact that a fairness-satisfying decision policy
has on the well-being of different subpopulations. In a similar spirit, Hu & Chen (2020) showed that always
preferring “more fair” classifiers does not abide by the Pareto Principle (the principle that a policy must be
preferable for at least one of multiple groups) in terms of welfare. Motivated by these findings, our work
acknowledges that algorithmic policies affect individuals and institutions in many dimensions, and explicitly
encodes these dimensions in policy optimization.
We will show that fairness constrained policies that result in per-group score thresholds and their -
fair equivalent soft-constrained analogs (Elzayn et al., 2019) can be cast as specific instances of the Pareto
framework that we study. Analyzing the limitations of this optimization regime with imperfect scores therefore
connects to a recent literature on achieving group fairness with noisy or missing group class labels (Lamy
et al., 2019; Awasthi et al., 2019), including using proxies of group status (Gupta et al., 2018; Chen et al.,
2019). The explicit welfare effects of selection in our model also complement the notion of utilization in fair
allocation problems Elzayn et al. (2019); Donahue & Kleinberg (2020).
2.2 Multi-objective Machine Learning
We consider two simultaneous goals of a learned classifier: achieving high profit value of the classification
policy, while improving a measure of social welfare. This relates to an existing literature on multi-objective
optimization in machine learning Jin & Sendhoff (2008); Jin (2006), where many algorithms exist for finding
or approximating global optima (Deb & Kalyanmoy, 2001; Knowles, 2006; De´side´ri, 2012) under different
problem formulations.
Our work studies the Pareto solutions that arise from learned score functions, and is therefore related to,
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but distinct from a large literature on learning Pareto frontiers directly. Evolutionary strategies are a popular
class of approaches to estimating a Pareto frontier from empirical data, as they refine a class of several policies
at once Deb & Kalyanmoy (2001); Kim & de Weck (2005). Many of these strategies use surrogate convex loss
functions to afford better convergence to solutions. Surrogate functions can be defined over each dimension
independently Knowles (2006), or as a single function over both objective dimensions Loshchilov et al. (2010).
While surrogate loss functions play an important role in a direct optimization of non-convex utility functions,
our framework provides an alternative approach, so long as scores functions can be reliably estimated.
Another class of methods explicitly incorporates models of uncertainty in dual-objective optimization (Peitz
& Dellnitz, 2018; Paria et al., 2019). For sequential decision-making, there has been recent work on finding
Pareto-optimal policies for reinforcement learning settings Van Moffaert & Nowe´ (2014); Liu et al. (2014);
Roijers & Whiteson (2017). To promote applicability of our work to a variety of real-world domains where
noise sources are diverse, and the effects of single policy enactments complex, we first develop a methodology
under a noise-free setting, then extend to reasonable forms of error in provided estimates.
2.3 Measures of Social Welfare
The definition and measurement of welfare is an important and complex problem that has received considerable
attention in the social science literature (cf. ?Deaton, 2016; ?). There, a standard approach is to sum up
individual measures of welfare, to obtain an aggregate measure of societal welfare. The separability assumption
(independent individual scores) is a standard simplifying assumption (e.g. Florio, 2014) that appears in the
foundational work of Pigou (1920), as well as ?, ?, Arrow (1963) and Sen (1973). Future work may explore
alternative social welfare function (e.g. ?). Our focus is on bringing machine learning to the most common
notion of welfare.
3 Problem Setting: Pareto-optimal Policies
We consider a setting in which a centralized policymaker has two simultaneous objectives: to maximize some
private return (such as revenue or user engagement), which we generically refer to as profit ; and to improve a
public objective (such as social welfare or user health), which we refer to as welfare. The policymaker makes
decisions about individuals, who are specified by feature vectors x ∈ Rd. Decision policies are functions that
output a randomized decision pi(x) ∈ [0, 1] corresponding to the probability that an individual with features x
is selected. To each individual we associate a value p representing the expected profit to be garnered from
approving this individual and w encoding the change in welfare. The profit and welfare objectives are thus
expectations over the joint distribution of (w, p, x):
UW(pi) = E[w · pi(x)] and UP(pi) = E[p · pi(x)] . (1)
Notice that this aggregate measure of societal welfare is defined as a sum of individual measures of welfare;
this is a standard approach in the social science literature (see Section 2.3). While this induces limitations on
the form of the welfare function, it affords flexibility when focusing instead on the resulting binary decision, a
point we expand on in Section 6.
Given two objectives, one can no longer define a unique optimal policy pi. Instead, we focus on policies pi
which are Pareto-optimal Pareto (1906), in the sense that they are not strictly dominated by any alternative
policy, i.e. there is no pi′ such that both UP and UW are strictly larger under pi′.
For a general set of policy classes (defined in Proposition A.11), it is equivalent to consider policies that
maximize a weighted combination of both objectives. We can thus parametrize the Pareto-optimal policies
by α ∈ [0, 1]:
Definition 3.1 (Pareto-optimal policies). An α-Pareto-optimal policy (for α ∈ [0, 1]) satisfies:
pi?α ∈ argmax Uα(pi),
Uα(pi) := (1− α)UP(pi) + αUW(pi).
1All references starting with letters appear in the appendices.
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Figure 1: Illustration of a Pareto curve (bottom left) and the decision boundaries induced by three different
trade-off parameters α. Colored (darker in gray scale) points indicate selected individuals.
In the definition above, the maximization of pi is taken over the class of randomized policies pi(x)→ [0, 1].
In Section 3.1 we show that when features x can exactly encode scores the optimal policy is a threshold of
the scores.
3.1 Optimal Policies with Exact Scores
We briefly consider an idealized setting, where the welfare and profit contributions w and p can be directly
determined from the features x via exact score functions, fW(x) = w, fP(x) = p. These exact score functions
can be thought of as sufficient statistics for the decision: the expected weighted contribution from accepted
individuals is described by ((1 − α)p + αw). Therefore, one can show (Proposition A.2) that the optimal
policy is given by thresholding this composite:
pi?α(p, w) = I((1− α)p+ αw ≥ 0). (2)
Though they are all Pareto-optimal, the policies pi?α induce different trade-offs between the two objectives.
The parameter α determines this trade-off, tracing the Pareto frontier :
Pexact := {(UP(pi?α),UW(pi?α)) : α ∈ [0, 1]}
Figure 1 plots an example of this curve (bottom-left panel) and the corresponding decision rules for three
points along it. We note the concave shape of this curve, a manifestation of diminishing marginal returns: as
a decision policy forgoes profit to increase total welfare, less welfare is gained for the same amount of profit
forgone. The notion of diminishing return is formalized in Theorem A.5.
4 Pareto Frontiers with Inexact Scores
In many settings, we typically do not know the profit score p or welfare score w — or the score functions fP
and fW — for all individuals a priori. Instead, we might estimate score functions f̂P(x) and f̂W(x) from data
in the hope that these models can provide good predictions on future examples.
We study the class of score-based policies that act on the predicted scores:
Definition 4.1 (Score-based policy class).
Πemp := {pi : (f̂P(X), f̂W(X)) 7→ [0, 1] }
Focusing on this class of policies allows us to characterize optimal policies within this class (Section 4.1),
derive diagnosable bounds the utility of suboptimal policies (Section 4.3), and relate our results to common
fairness criteria (Section. 6). We summarize additional benefits as well as potential limitations of restricting
our study to this policy class in Section 7.
4
4.1 Pareto-optimality for Learned Scores
To characterize Pareto-optimal policies over Πemp, we define the following conditional expectations over the
distribution D of (x, p, w):
µP(f̂P(x), f̂W(x)) := ED[p | f̂P(x), f̂W(x)],
µW(f̂P(x), f̂W(x)) := ED[w | f̂P(x), f̂W(x)] .
Intuitively, these values represent our best guesses of p and w, given the predicted scores. We define pioptα as
the threshold policy on the composite of these predictions:
pioptα := I((1− α) · µP + α · µW ≥ 0).
Theorem 4.1 (Pareto frontier in inexact knowledge case). Given any population distribution D over (x, p, w)
and empirical score functions f̂W and f̂P,
(i) The policies pioptα are Pareto optimal over the class Πemp, with pi
opt
α ∈ argmaxpi∈Πemp Uα(pi).
(ii) The Pareto frontier P(Πemp) is given by {(UP(pioptα ),UW(pioptα ) : α ∈ [0, 1]}. The associated function
mapping suppi∈Πemp{UW(pi) : UP(pi) = p} is concave and non-increasing in p.
(iii) The empirical frontier Pemp is dominated by the exact frontier Pexact. That is, if (p, wexact) ∈ Pexact
and (p, wemp) ∈ Pemp, then wemp ≤ wexact.
Thus an optimal empirical-score based policy can also be realized as a threshold policy (this time of
the conditional expectations), and it obeys the same diminishing-returns phenomenon as in the exact score
case. One example of score predictors that achieves this optimality is the Bayes optimal estimators i.e.,
f̂P(x) = E[p | x] and f̂W(x) = E[w | x]. We present a proof of Theorem 4.1 in Appendix A.4.
4.2 Plug-in Policies
In general, we may have access to score predictions or the ability to learn them from data, but not a guarantee
that the predictions are Bayes’ optimal. In the hopes that the predicted scores will suffice, we can define a
natural selection rule based on α-defined plug-in threshold policies.
Definition 4.2 (Plug-in policy). For α ∈ [0, 1] and score predictions f̂P(x), f̂W(x), the α-plug-in policy is:
piplugα (x) = I((1− α)f̂P(x) + αf̂W(x) ≥ 0) . (3)
Since pioptα requires computing conditional expectations over the distribution D, it will in general will
differ from the plug-in policy (3). The following corollary of Theorem 4.1 gives a condition in which pioptα and
piplugα coincide.
Corollary 4.2. The plug-in policies piplugα are optimal in the class Πemp as long as the predicted score
functions are well-calibrated, in the sense that E[p | f̂P(x), f̂W(x)] = f̂P(x) and E[w | f̂P(x), f̂W(x)] = f̂W(x).
Proof. In this case, µ¯p = f̂P(x) and µ¯w = f̂W(x), so we may invoke Theorem 4.1.
Under typical conditions (Liu et al., 2019), this form of calibration can be achieved by empirical risk
minimization.
In Section 4.3, we bound the error in the plug-in policies by the error by the individual errors in each
score. Simulation experiments in Section 5 detail the use of the plug in policy under controlled degradations
of learned score accuracy. Real-data experiments provide further insight into using the plug-in policy for
welfare-aware optimization in practice.
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Figure 2: Simulated experiments corresponding to the setting in Example 1 (fixing σw = σp = 1). Empirical
frontiers P(Πemp) for 100 random trials with n = 5, 000 each are shown as overlaid translucent curves. Exact
frontiers Pexact are shown as dashed curves.
4.3 Bounding Pareto Inefficiencies
Even when plug-in policies are not optimal, the sub-optimality of the resulting classifier in terms of the utility
function Uα is bounded by the α-weighted sum of `1 errors in the profit and welfare scores.
Proposition 4.3 (Sub-optimality Bound). For any score prediction functions f̂P(x), f̂W(x) and α ∈ [0, 1], the
gap in α-utility from applying the plug-in policy (3) with f̂P(x), f̂W(x) versus applying the optimal policy (2)
with true scores fP, fW, is bounded above as
Uα(pi?α)− Uα(piplugα ) ≤ (1− α)E[|f̂P(x)− fP(x)|] + αE[|f̂W(x)− fW(x)|]. (4)
Note that by definition of pi?α, Uα(pi?α) − Uα(piplugα ) ≥ 0. The proof of Proposition 4.3 is given in
Appendix A.5.
Proposition 4.3 provides a general bound on the α-performance of the plug-in policy which holds for any
distribution on scores and estimator errors. To provide further insight, we consider a specific distributional
setting.
Example 1. Suppose that individuals’ true scores are distributed as:
(wi, pi) ∼i.i.d. N
([
0
0
]
,
[
σ2w ρσwσp
ρσwσp σ
2
p
])
(5)
Let the prediction errors εpi := pˆi − pi and εwi := wˆi −wi be independent of the true scores pi, wi, zero-mean,
and sub-Gaussian with parameters σεp and σεw , respectively.
This example elucidates how correlation between profit and welfare scores affects the empirical Pareto
frontier.
Proposition 4.4. In the setting of Example 1 with −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, E[Uα(pi?α)] = σy√2pi and the expected α-utility
of the plug in policy is at least: 2
E[Uα(piplugα )] ≥ E[Uα(pi?α)]
(
1− 2 · σ˜
2
σ˜2 + σ2y
)
(6)
where σ2y = α
2σ2w + (1− α)2σ2p + 2ρα(1− α)σwσp and σ˜2 = 4(α2σ2εw + (1− α)2σ2εp).
The proof of Proposition 4.4 is given in Appendix A.5. This lower bound is in terms of both the optimal
α-utility and a discount factor. Because σ2y is increasing in ρ for any α ∈ (0, 1), both of these terms are
2The constant on σ˜2can be reduced to 1 when εw |= εp.
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Figure 3: Lower bound (right hand side of Eq. (6)) on expected α-utility as a function of α and correlation in
the true scores, from Proposition 4.4, with σw = σp = 1; σεw = .5; σεp = 0.1.
increasing in ρ. Thus, the expected α-utility of the plug in policy is higher for correlated scores, not only
because the optimal α-utility is higher, but also because the discount factor is closer to 1.
Figure 3 shows the lower bound on expected α-utility with noisy scores as a function of possible score
correlations ρ and trade-off parameters α, for a fixed setting of predictor noise in Example 1. For comparatively
small error in profit scores and moderate welfare error, the lower bound on the α-utility increases as the
correlation (ρ) between the scores increases. This captures how the low-noise profit score indirectly improves
decisions about the high-noise welfare. The lower bound is decreasing in α for positive ρ, which reflects the
higher variance introduced by placing more weight on the noisier welfare score.
5 Experiments
This section presents three sets of empirical results. In Section 5.1 we corroborate our theoretical results under
different simulated distributions on scores and prediction errors. Our second experiment studies empirical
Pareto frontiers from learned scores with realistic degradation of training data, in the context of sustainable
abalone collection in Section 5.2. Our third experiment in Section 5.3 shows how our methods facilitate
trading off between user engagement with predicted quality of content in a corpus of YouTube videos, using
pre-learned scores.
5.1 Simulation Experiments
Our first set of simulations shows the performance of the plug-in policy when scores are perturbed by additive
noise of varying degrees in each dimension (Fig. 2a). We instantiate true scores wi and pi as in Eq. (5) with
ρ = 0 and σ2w = σ
2
p = 1, and instantiate predicted scores as:
f̂W(xi) = wi + εwi εwi ∼ N (0, σ2εw), (7)
f̂P(xi) = pi + εpi εpi ∼ N (0, σ2εp)
These score predictions satisfy the well-calibrated condition of Corollary 4.2. The results for different pairs
(σεw , σ
2
εp are shown in Figure 2a. As the noise in scores increases, the empirical Pareto frontiers recede from
the exact frontier Pexact. Additionally, higher noise in the predicted scores imposes a wider distribution of
empirical Pareto frontiers.
Next, we study the effect of noise in predictions when scores are correlated (Fig. 2b). We draw wi and
pi according to Eq. (5) with σw = σp = 1 and correlation parameter ρ. We then add random noise as in
Eq. (7) with parameters σεw = σεp = 1.0. Note that in this setting, scores are in general not calibrated due
to the correlation between wi and pi. For positive values of ρ, the exact and empirical utilities are greatest
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at α = 0.5, since the correlation in the scores allows us to overcome some of the noise in each individual
parameter, as predicted by Proposition 4.4.
Lastly, we study the space of empirical and exact frontiers with degraded noise when scores are correlated
and prediction error is higher in the welfare the score, with σεp = 0.5 whereas σεw = 2.0 (Fig. 2c). While the
optimal Pareto frontiers are the same as in Fig. 2b, we see a stark change in the empirical Pareto frontiers.
Compared to the case of no correlation, the empirical Pareto frontier is expanded when ρ > 0 and when ρ < 0
the frontier recedes. Additionally, we see evidence that due to the correlation, piplugα is no longer guaranteed
to be optimal, as welfare utility decreases for large enough α when ρ = 0.5.
5.2 Learned Scores with Imperfect Data: Abalone
Our next example is motivated by the domain of ecologically sustainable selection, where the goal is to
select profitable mollusks to catch and keep, while having minimal impact on the natural development of the
mollusks’ ecosystem. We learn scores for the age and profitability of each abalone from data, and perform
experiments to test the degradation of the empirical Pareto frontiers under realistic degradations of the
data. While our characterization of the problem is highly simplified, the main focus of this experiment is to
demonstrate the instantiation of Pareto curves for different predictor function classes and different regimes of
data availability.
The welfare measure we use is an increasing function of age (see Appendix B for full experimental details),
encoding that it is more sustainable to harvest older abalones. We define the profit score of each abalone as
a linear function of meat weight and shell area. We use the features (sex, total weight, height, width, and
diameter) to train score predictors. We derive these measures from physical data collected by Nash et al.
(1994) (accessed via the UCI data repository Dua & Graff (2017)). The correlation of the profit and welfare
scores is 0.56.
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Figure 4: Abalone empirical frontiers as training set size increases.
In this setting, we study the effectiveness of two models — ridge regression and random forests — to learn
scores with which to instantiate the plug-in policy. To assess how the empirical Pareto frontiers degrade
under realistic notions of imperfect data, we subsample training instances to reflect a hypothetical regime
were data is sparse and we subsample features to reflect a hypothetical regime where entire measurements
were not recorded in the original dataset.
Figure 4 shows the empirical Pareto frontiers reached as we change the size of the training data set from
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Figure 5: Abalone empirical frontiers for different feature sets.
Figure 6: Distribution of YouTube data predicted quality scores unlabeled videos (gray), and hand labeled
conspiracy (red) and non-conspiracy (purple) videos.
which learn the profit and welfare scores. Even with 33 training samples (1% of the original training set), the
set of plug-in policies traces a meaningful trade-off over α. For severely degraded scores (16 training samples -
just 0.5% of the original training sets), the error on the welfare score predictions is so high that instantiating
a plug-in policy with α > 0 actually decreases welfare overall.
Figure 5 shows the empirical Pareto frontiers reached as we change the features learned to train the model,
using just length, just weight, or all seven features as in Fig. 4.
The trends to increasing the data set size and feature set are consistent with four replications done
on separate training and evaluation splits; we find that Pareto frontiers dominate each other roughly in
accordance with the mean average error of the score predictions (Figs. 10 and 11 in Appendix B.1). The
mean average error of welfare scores is substantially greater than the average error of profit scores for most
prediction instances (Figures 10 and 11 in Appendix B.1), thus the empirical frontiers are farther from Pexact
in the welfare dimension than the profit dimension.
Altogether, the empirical Pareto frontiers are relatively robust to small data regimes, as well as to missing
predictors. However, when predictions have very high error (diagnosable by cross-validation or holdout set
error), empirical Pareto frontiers degrade quickly.
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Figure 7: Balancing user engagement and health of hosted YouTube videos.
5.3 Balancing User Engagement and Health
We now illustrate how the multi-objective framework can be used to balance the desire to promote high
quality content with the need for profit. We work with a dataset that contains measures of content quality
and content engagement for 39,817 YouTube videos, which was constructed as part of an independent effort
to automatically ascertain the quality and truthfulness of YouTube videos Faddoul et al. (2020).
The measure of quality f̂W we use is a function of the ‘conspiracy score’ developed by Faddoul et al.
(2020), which estimates the probability that the video promotes a debunked conspiracy theory. From this
score sconspiracy ∈ [0, 1] we derive a predicted ‘quality score’ as (0.95 − sconspiracy) (see Appendix B.2 for
details).
We instantiate the profit score fP[i] for video i as log((1 + # views[i])/100, 000). Dividing by a large
constant represents that videos with low view counts may not be profitable due to storage and hosting costs.
The resulting distribution over fP and f̂W is shown in Figure 6 (gray dots), where dotted lines denote 0-utility
thresholds in each score.
Using these scores and predictions, we estimate a Pareto frontier using the optimal policies piplugα for
learned scores from Eq. (3). The resulting estimated Pareto curve is shown in Figure 7a. The curve is concave,
demonstrating the phenomenon of diminishing returns in the trade-off between total user engagement and
average video quality. While there is always some quality to gain by sacrificing some total engagement, these
relative gains are greatest when the starting point is close to an engagement-maximizing policy. Specifically,
at the maximum-engagement end of the spectrum (lower right star), we can gain a 1.1% increase in average
video quality for a 0.1% loss in total engagement. However, for a policy with trade-off rate α = 0.8 (upper
left star), to obtain an increase of 0.3% in welfare, a larger loss of 5.2% in user engagement is required.
Next, we assess the validity of this estimated Pareto curve using the small set of 541 hand-labeled training
set instances from which sconspiracy was learned. This assessment is likely optimistic due to the fact that the
score predictor functions were trained on this same data; nonetheless, this is an important check to perform
on the estimated Pareto frontier.
In Figure 7b we plot the optimal-in-hindsight Pareto frontier (dashed gray line) had we known the labels
a priori and applied thresholds according to (2). We also plot the performance of our estimated policy piplugα
on the labeled instances (black line). The stars on each curve correspond to decision thresholds with α = 0
and α = 0.8, and illustrate the alignment of the curves.
Relating back to Theorem 4.1, we see that performance of the learned scores (black line) is dominated
by that of the optimal classifier, as is the predicted Pareto curve (thick blue line). Here the predicted
Pareto curve under-predicts the actual performance; in general it is possible for the opposite to be true.
Encouragingly, we observe that the curves representing the predicted and actual performance show similar
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qualitative trade-offs.
6 Connections to Fairness Constraints
Having shown our main results on learning Pareto-optimal policies with limited data, we now illustrate
connections between our framework and approaches based on fair machine learning that constrain classification
decisions to satisfy certain criteria. For example, in the setting of hiring or admissions, one might require that
the same proportion of male and female candidates are admitted, i.e. demographic parity. We demonstrate
that profit maximization with group fairness constraints corresponds to multi-objective optimization over
profit and welfare for an induced definition of welfare. This connection illustrates that even though we
consider a welfare function defined from individual welfare scores, our framework can encode more collective
conceptions of welfare, like those arising from group fairness constraints.
Consider the setting of requiring demographic parity between two subgroups A and B of a larger population
(more general results are presented in Appendix C). In this case, we decompose policies over groups such that
pi = (piA, piB). Policies are chosen to maximize the following -demographic parity constrained problem:
max
pi,β
UP(pi) s.t. E[pij(x) |x in group j] = βj,
|βA − βB| ≤ 
(8)
We can restrict our attention to threshold policies pij(p) = I(p ≥ tj) where tj are group-dependent thresholds Liu
et al. (2018). Notice that the unconstrained solution would simply be piMaxUtil(p) = I(p ≥ 0) for all groups.
For this reason, we consider groups with tj < 0 as comparatively disadvantaged (since their threshold increases
in the absence of fairness constraints) and tj > 0 as advantaged. Then, the multi-objective framework provides
an additional perspective on the trade-offs between -fairness and profit.
Corollary 6.1. It is possible to define fixed welfare scores such that the family of inexact fair policies
parametrized by any  ≥ 0 in (8) corresponds to a family of Pareto-optimal policies parametrized by α().
The group-dependent welfare scores are such that w ≥ 0 for all individuals in the disadvantaged group and
w ≤ 0 in the advantaged group. Furthermore, the induced trade-off parameter α() increases as  decreases.
Corollary 6.1 follows from Theorem C.3. Fairness constraints can be seen as encoding implicit group-
dependent welfare scores for individuals, where members of disadvantaged groups are assigned positive
welfare weights and members of advantaged groups assigned negative weights. Figure 8 illustrates this result
applied to data from a credit lending scenario from Barocas et al. (2019), where welfare scores are induced
for individuals depending on their race and likelihood of repayment. Further details on the generation of
these weights are presented in Appendix C. This correspondence is related to the analysis of welfare weights
in Hu & Chen (2018), however, our perspective focuses on trade-offs between welfare and profit objectives, in
contrast to pure welfare maximization.
In the case that group membership is believed to correspond to the welfare impact of selection, Corollary 6.1
connects our results in Section 4 with a body of work on achieving fairness when group labels are approximate
or estimated Kallus et al. (2020). While some applications may directly call for statistical parity as a criterion,
Corollary 6.1 emphasizes the inevitability of fairness constraints as trade-offs between multiple objectives,
and frames these trade-offs explicitly in terms of welfare measures.
7 Conclusions
We present a methodology for developing welfare-aware policies that jointly optimize a private return (such
as profit) with a public objective (such as social welfare). Taking care to consider data-limited regimes, we
develop theory around the optimality of using learned predictors to make decisions. Experiments corroborate
our theoretical results, showing that thresholding on predicted scores can approach a Pareto-optimal policy.
This score-based approach to balancing competing objectives with noisy data is attractive for several
reasons:
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Figure 8: Trade-offs between profit and fairness in lending can be equivalently encoded by a multi-objective
framework.
• Score-based policies can trade off multiple objectives with scalar predictions, with error bounded by a
weighted sum of the errors in the learned scores.
• The plug-in policy is a learned decision rule that is easily explained and diagnosed — in line with the
desire for transparent classification rules in practice.
• It provides a crisp and interpretable connection to fair-constrained profit maximization, but reframes
the problem as one of multi-objective optimization (see Sec. 6).
While separating the problem of instantiating learned policies from the problem of learning scores has
desirable benefits, we note the limitations of this approach as well. First, the plug-in policy is not guaranteed
to be the optimal policy learned from data. Thus, when further assumptions on the problem structure are
appropriate, it may be worthwhile to consider more general policy classes learned from data. Second, the
score-based approach shifts much of the difficulty of welfare-aware machine learning toward defining and
predicting welfare, which is an area of active academic and policy debate Griffin (1986); Kahneman & Krueger
(2006).
When welfare utilities are estimable, the ability to trade off context-sensitive measures with general
policies can improve upon the status quo of applying machine learning policies in welfare-sensitive domains.
Further, a multi-objective framework could allow communities to understand the trade-offs between competing
definitions of welfare or fairness in data constrained situations.
Taken together, these results help illustrate how machine learning can be used to design policies that
prioritize the social impact of an algorithmic decision from the outset, rather than as an afterthought. By
elucidating the possible trade-offs between competing objectives, and by illustrating the importance of
measurement and prediction error in multi-objective optimization, we hope this work encourages new ways of
thinking about welfare-aware machine learning.
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A Proofs for General Characterization of Pareto Curves
A.1 Pareto Policies Optimize Weighted Combination of Utilities
Proposition A.1 (Pareto optimal policies optimize a composite objective). Let Π be a set of policies which
is convex, and compact in a topology in which pi 7→ UP(pi) and UW(pi) are continuous. 3 Then, a policy pi? ∈ Π
is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists an α ∈ [0, 1] for which
pi? ∈ argmax
pi∈Π
Uα(pi)
Uα(pi) := (1− α)UP(pi) + αUW(pi).
Proof. First, we prove that if pi? ∈ argmaxpi Uα(pi) := (1 − α)UP(pi) + αUW(pi), then pi? is Pareto optimal.
Suppose that there exists an α for which pi? ∈ argmaxpi Uα(pi). If α ∈ {0, 1}, then pi? maximizes either
UW(·) or UP(·), and is therefore Pareto optimal by definition. Otherwise, if α ∈ (0, 1), suppose for the sake
of contradiction that pi? is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists a policy pi for which UW(pi?) ≤ UW(pi)
and UP(pi?) ≤ UP(pi), where one of these inequalities is strict. We can then check that Uα(pi?) < Uα(pi),
contradiction that pi? ∈ argmaxpi Uα(pi).
To show the other direction, suppose that pi? is Pareto optimal. If pi? maximizes either profit or welfare,
then pi? ∈ argmaxpi Uα(pi) for either α = 1 or α = 0. Otherwise, let W = UW(pi?). Then, by Pareto optimality,
pi? ∈ argmax{UP(pi) : UW(pi) ≥ UW(pi?), pi ∈ Π}
= argmax
pi∈Π
(
UP(pi) + min
t≥0
t(UW(pi)− UW(pi?)
)
= argmax
pi∈Π
min
t≥0
(UP(pi) + t (UW(pi)− UW(pi?))) .
The map UP(pi) and UW(pi) are both linear functions in pi. Hence, if Π is a a convex, and compact in a
topology in which pi 7→ UP(pi) and UW(pi) are continuous, Sion’s minimax theorem Komiya (1988) ensures
that strong duality holds, which means that we can switch order of the minimization over t and maximization
over pi. Thus, for some t ≥ 0,
pi? ∈ argmax
pi
(UP(pi) + t · UW(pi)− t · UW(pi?)) = argmax
pi
(UP(pi) + t · UW(pi))
= argmax
pi
(
1
1 + t
U(pi) + t
1 + t
UW(pi)
)
= argmax
pi
(U1/(1+t)(pi)) ,
as needed.
A.2 Optimal Policies under Exact Information
Here we verify the optimality of threshold policies under exact information:
Proposition A.2 (Pareto optimal policies on exact scores are threshold policies). For the weighted utility
Uα, the optimal policy pi?α over the unrestricted class Π? is a threshold on a weighted combination of w and p,
namely4,
pi?α(p, w) = I(αw + (1− α)p ≥ 0). (9)
Proof of Proposition A.2. Consider the reward of an arbitrary policy pi. Recall that pi(x) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
probability that pi classifies an individual with features x as a 1. Since pi(x) · z ≤ z · I(z ≥ 0) for pi(x) ∈ [0, 1]
and z ∈ R, we can bound Uα[pi] = Ex[pi(x) · (αw(x) + (1− α)p(x))] ≤ Ex[max{0, αw(x) + (1− α)p(x)}]. We
can directly check that the threshold policy pi?α(p, w) = I(αw + (1− α)p ≥ 0) saturates this bound.
3The convexity of Π means that Π is closed under the randomized combination of policies. In the simplest case, compactness
is achieved when the space of features is finite (e.g. features x can only take a values in a discrete, finite subset of Rd).
4When the distribution over (w, p) is sufficiently smooth, we can ignore the case where αw + (1− α)p = 0.
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A.3 Well-Behaved Pareto Curves
In this section, we establish that under mild regularity conditions, the Pareto frontier takes of the form of a
continuous curve. The following assumption stipulates these conditions:
Assumption 1 (Well-Behaved Policy Class). Let Π be a policy class, and let Pmax := suppi∈Π UP(pi),
Wmax := suppi UW(pi), let Pmin := suppi∈Π{UP(pi) : UW(pi) = Wmax). A policy class Π is said to be well-behaved
if for any pi ∈ Π:
(a) {p : (p, w) ∈ P for some w ∈ R} = [Pmin,Pmax]
(b) For any p ∈ [Pmin,Pmax], argmaxpi∈Π{UW(pi) : UP(pi) = p} is achieved.
The following lemma shows that the above assumptions are reasonable, in that we shouldn’t expect Pareto
optimal policies with p /∈ [Pmax,Pmin]
Lemma A.3. Suppose that Π is any policy class such that there exists piW attaining UW(piW) = Wmax. Then,
for any (p, w) ∈ P(Π) which is a Pareto-optimal pair, p ∈ [Pmin,Pmax].
Proof. Clearly p ≤ Pmax, since Pmax is the maximal attainable profit. Now, suppose that (p, w) ∈ P(Π) is a
Pareto optimal pair, and assume for the sake of contradiction that p < Pmin. Since there exists a UW(piW) =
Wmax, there exists, for any  > 0, some policy pi such that UW(pi) = UW(piW), and UP(pi) ≥ Pmin − .
My making  sufficiently small, we can ensure that UP(pi) > p. On the other hand, UW(pi) = UW(piW) =
maxpi∈Π U(pi), so that in particular UW(pi) ≥ w. Hence, pi dominates the policy with utilities (p, w) in a
pareto sense, so that (p, w) /∈ P(Π).
We now establish the existence of Pareto curves for for well-behaved policy classes:
Lemma A.4 (Properties of the Pareto Curve). For well-behaved function classes (Assumption 1), there
exists a unique, increasing function gΠ such that
P(Π) = {(p,gΠ(p)) : p ∈ [Pmin,Pmax]} , (10)
where gΠ(p) := suppi∈Π{UW(pi) : UP(pi) = p}, and where we recall Pmin,Pmin from Assumption 1. If in
addition Π is convex, then gΠ(p) is concave.
Proof of Lemma A.4. Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
First, we show P(Π) ⊆ {(p,gΠ(p)) : p ∈ [Pmin,Pmax]}. Given (p, w) ∈ P(Π) corresponding to a policy
pi, we must have that p ∈ [Pmin,Pmax] by Lemma A.3. Moreover, by Pareto optimality, w = gΠ(p) :=
suppi∈Π{UW(pi) : UP(pi) = p} since this optimal is attained by Assumption 1.
For the reverse inclusion, we know that if p ∈ [Pmin,Pmax], then by Assumption 1(a), there exists a policy
pi such that UP(pi) = p. Then, by Assumption 1(b), there exists a policy pi which maximizes UW(pi) : UP(pi) = p.
By definition, UW(pi) = gΠ(p), and pi is Pareto optimal by definition. Hence (p, w) ∈ P(Π).
We now show that that convexity of Π implies concavity of gΠ. It suffices to show that, for any points
(p1, w1), (p2, w2) ∈ P(Π), and any λ ∈ [0, 1], λw1+(1−λ)w2 ≤ gΠ(λp1+(1−λ)p2). Indeed, by definition of the
Pareto curve, there exist policies pi1 and pi2 such that (UP(pii),UW(pii)) = (pi, wi) for i ∈ {1, 2}. By convexity
of Π, the policy pi := λpi1 + (1− λ)pi2 ∈ Π. Moreover, UP(pi) = λp1 + (1− λ)p2 and UW(pi) = λw1 + (1− λ)w2.
Finally, by definition of gΠ, UW(pi) ≤ gΠ(UP(pi)), which concludes the proof.
Lemma A.4 confirms that the Pareto curve, as we might intuitively imagine it, actually exists. With this
in hand, we now show that given the Pareto-optimal policies with exact scores, the parameterizing function
gΠ is concave. Pictorially, gΠ(p) is the Pareto frontier interpreted as a function of allowable profit p which
returns the maximum amount of welfare w that can be achieved at this profit level (e.g. the black curve in
Figure 1, left).
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Theorem A.5 (Pareto Frontier under exact knowledge). Suppose that the unconstrained policies are a
well-behaved class. Consider the setting where the welfare and profit are specified exactly by scores w and p.
Then, given any population distribution over p, w, the Pareto optimal policies pi?α are given by Eq. (2) and the
Pareto frontier P(Π?) is given by
Pexact := {(UP(pi?α),UW(pi?α)) : α ∈ [0, 1]}
Moreover, the associated function gexact(p) is non-increasing and concave.
Proof of Theorem A.5. The first statement follows from Proposition A.2, and that gPexact(p) is non-decreasing
follows from Lemma A.4.
Convexity of gPexact(p) follows from Lemma A.4, and the fact that Π? is convex.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
For the theorem, we assume that both policies based on empirical scores and those based on exact scores are
well-behaved in the sense of Assumption 1.
We first establish part (a), namely that
pioptα ∈ argmax
pi∈Πemp
E
[
Uα(pi(f̂W, f̂P))
]
.
Where recall that pioptα := (1− α) · µP + α · µW. We have that
Uα(pi) = E[((1− α)p+ αw))pi(f̂P, f̂W)]
= E[
(
(1− α)E[p | f̂P, f̂W] + αE[w | f̂P, f̂W]
)
· pi(f̂P, f̂W)]
:= E[
(
(1− α)µP(f̂P, f̂W) + αµW(f̂P, f̂W)
)
· pi(f̂P, f̂W)]
≤ E
[
max
{
(1− α)µP((f̂P, f̂W) + αµW(f̂P, f̂W), 0
}]
= Uα(pioptα ).
Hence, we obtain the Pareto optimality of pioptα by Proposition A.1.
Part (b) is a direct consequence of Lemma A.4 and the assumption that our policy class is well behaved.
For part (c), empirical policies are dominated by those induced by the true score functions because, as
established, the Pareto optimal policies based on the true score functions are in fact Pareto optimal over all
policies that are induced by a function of the features x.
A.5 Utilitity Loss Induced by Score Function Suboptimality
Proof of Proposition 4.3. We compute
Uα(piplugα )− Uα(piα) = E[((1− α)p+ αw)
(
piplugα − piα
)
] .
Define the functions Y (x) = (1−α)fP(x)+αfW(x), and let E(x) = (1−α)(f̂P(x)−fP(x))+α(f̂W(x)−fW(x)).
Then, piplugα (x) − piα = I(Y (x) + E(x) ≥ 0) − I(Y (x) ≥ 0). We see that this difference is at most 1 in
magnitude, and is 0 unless possibly if |Y (x)| ≤ |E(x)|. Hence,
|Y (x)| · |piplugα (x)− piα(x)| ≤ |E(x)| .
Therefore
|Uα(piplugα )− Uα(piα)| = |E[Y (x)(piplugα (x)− piα(x)]|
≤ E[|Y (x)| · |piplugα (x)− piα(x)|]
≤ E[|E(x)|] = E[|(1− α)(f̂P(x)− fP(x)) + α(f̂W(x)− fW(x))|]
≤ (1− α)E[|f̂P(x)− fP(x)|] + αE[|f̂W(x)− fW(x))|].
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We remark that in general, optimizing arbitrary loss functions for function value states (e.g. estimating
α-utilities for all α directly from features) requires a prohibitively large sample (Balkanski & Singer, 2017).
The structures of the combined learning problems and α-utility in our setting allow us to circumvent this
lower bound.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. By definition of pi?α,
Uα(pi?α)− Uα(piplugα ) = E[|αw + (1− α)p| · I(pi?α 6= piplugα )] (11)
Now consider the event pi?α 6= piplugα . This happens only when the predicted scores incur an opposite
classification by the α threshold policy, that is, (αwi + (1−α)pi) · (αwˆi + (1−α)pˆi) < 0. Define the quantities
yi := αwi + (1− α)pi
zi := α(wˆi − wi) + (1− α)(pˆi − pi) ,
so that
Uα(pi?α)− Uα(piplugα ) = E[|y| · I(y(y + z) < 0)] ,
where y ∼ N (0, α2σ2w + (1 − α)2σ2p + 2ρα(1 − α)σwσp) and z is sub-Gaussian with squared parameter
σ˜2 = 4(α2σ2εw + (1− α)2σ2εp) (Wainwright, 2019).5 By assumption, the errors are independent of the scores,
so that
E[|y| · I(y(y + z) < 0)] = E [|y| · E [I(y(y + z) < 0)|y]]
= E [|y| · P (y(y + z) < 0)] .
Now by sub-Gaussianity of z, we bound P (y(y + z) < 0) for any fixed y:
P (y(y + z) < 0) ≤
{
P (z < −y) y > 0
P (z > −y) y < 0
≤ e− y
2
2σ˜2 ,
so that by symmetry of the distribution of y, the expectation can be bounded as
E[|y| · I(y(y + z) < 0)] ≤ 2
∫ ∞
0
y(e−y
2/(2σ˜2)) · 1
σy
√
2pi
e−y
2/(2σ2y)dy
=
√
2
σy
√
pi
∫ ∞
0
ye
− y22
(
1
σ˜2
+ 1
σ2y
)
dy
=
1
σy
(
1
σ˜2 +
1
σ2y
)1/2 ·
√
2
(
1
σ˜2 +
1
σ2y
)1/2
√
pi
∫ ∞
0
ye
− y22
(
1
σ˜2
+ 1
σ2y
)
dy .
This is a scaled mean of a half-normal distribution with scale parameter
(
1
σ˜2 +
1
σ2y
)−1/2
. Thus, difference in
α-utility is bounded as
Uα(pi?α)− Uα(piplugα ) ≤
√
2
σy
√
pi
(
1
σ˜2
+
1
σ2y
)−1
=
σy ·
√
2√
pi
(
σ˜2
σ˜2 + σ2y
)
5When w and p are assumed to be independent, σ˜2 = (α2σ2εw + (1− α)2σ2εp ) Wainwright (2019).
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Now, note that the expected utility of the optimal classifier is E[yI{ y ≥ 0} ≥ 0] for y ∼ N (0, σ2y) as
defined above. Then as one half the expectation of a half-normal distribution with scale parameter σy,
E[Uα(pi?)] =
σy√
2pi
=
1√
2pi
√
α2σ2w + (1− α)2σ2p + 2ρα(1− α)σwσp ,
which is nondecreasing in ρ for α ∈ [0, 1], and increasing in ρ for α ∈ (0, 1). Then, the expected Pareto utility
of the plug in policy can be lower bounded as
E[Uα(piplugα )] = E[Uα(pi?α)−
(Uα(pi?α)− Uα(piplugα ))]
≥ σy√
2pi
(
1− c σ˜
2
σ˜2 + σy
)
= E[Uα(pi?α)]
(
1− c σ˜
2
σ˜2 + σ2y
)
Where c = 2. Since σy is increasing in ρ for α ∈ (0, 1), the lower bound on E[Uα(piplugα )] is increasing as
well.
B Experimental Details
Code for simulation and real data experiments is available at https://github.com/estherrolf/multi-objective-impact.
All experiments were run on a personal laptop running unix with 16GB memory and a 2.5GhZ Intel i7
processor.
B.1 Abalone
The features included in x for each model are: sex (female/male/infant), length, diameter, height, and whole
weight. There are in total 4177 data points.6 We instantiate scores as:
p := meat price per gram · (200 · shucked weight) + shell price by cm2 · (20 · length) · (20 · diameter)
w := c · log((rings + 1.5)/10)
where meat price per gram = 0.25 and shell price per cm2 = 0.32, and the constant factors of 20 and
200 match units of the original data with units of these prices. We add 1.5 to the ring count to get age, and
divide by 10 before taking the logarithm to encode that harvesting abalone less than 10 years of age has
negative welfare. We scale the welfare weights by constant c so that the distribution of welfare and profit
have the same standard deviation.
Figure 9 shows the distributions of the scores. The average of the welfare scores is 9.13, the average of the
profit scores is 0.00, and the correlation of welfare and profit scores is 0.56.
Figures 10 and 11 show the performance of the scores and plug-in policies for different number of training
set sizes and different feature sets, to augment the results shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 of the main text. Main
text figures show performance on the first fold of five randomly chosen cross-validation folds, in these figures
we show all five folds along with the mean average errors of the predictors.
Within each of the five evaluation folds, we train the score models through cross-validation with 4 folds
within the training set. Since we leave 20% of data for evaluation in each outer fold, each model in each row of
Figure 11 is trained via 4-fold cross-validation on 80% of the data. For figure 11, we subset from the 5 training
sets of 80% of the total data, and run 4-fold cross-validation on these subsets to select model hyperparameters.
The hyperparameters we consider are λ = np.logspace(-8,2,base=10,num=11) for ridge regression and
num estimators = [200, 400] and depths = [4, 8] for the random forest model. We choose hyperparameters
to minimize the mean average error over the 4 folds. For ridge regression, we use the implementation from
sklearn.linear model.Ridge() and for random forest, sklearn.ensemble.RandomForestRegressor().
The hyperparameters chosen for generating Fig. 4 in the main text are presented in Table 1. The
hyperparameters chosen for generating Fig. 5 in the main text are presented in Table 2.
6Data is available for download at: https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Abalone .
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Figure 9: Summary of abalone score distributions.
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Figure 10: Performance with different training set sizes. Accompanies Fig. 4 in main text.
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Figure 11: Performance with different features sets. Accompanies Fig. 5 in main text.
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Table 1: Hyperparameter configurations to generate Fig. 4.
ridge regression random forest
regularization λ num. estimators maximum depth
# training points w p w p w p
16 1e1 1e-3 400 400 8 8
33 1e-3 1e-8 200 200 8 8
334 1e-3 1e-3 200 400 4 8
3341 1e-1 1e-1 200 400 4 8
Table 2: Hyperparameter configurations to generate Fig. 5.
ridge regression random forest
regularization λ num. estimators maximum depth
# features w p w p w p
length 1e-8 1e-2 200 200 4 8
weight 1e0 1e-2 400 200 4 4
all 1e-1 1e-1 400 400 4 8
B.2 YouTube
Data for the YouTube experiment is used with permission of the authors of Faddoul et al. (2020) (in progress;
data to be released publicly).
Defining an allowable quality threshold as the median score of all videos (= 0.95), we instantiate
f̂W = (1− sconspiracy)− 0.95. Note that no notions of engagement (e.g. view count, comment count) were
included as training data to learn sconspiracy. Instantiating profit scores as log((1 + # views[i])/100, 000)
models that videos with view counts below 100, 000 (roughly 32% of the videos in the validation set) do not
break a profit margin.
The “hand annotated” subset of the data consists of 541 video instances which are hand-labeled as either
conspiracy (251) or non-conspiracy (290), as well as their view counts and predictions. These validation
points are drawn from a different distribution, and thus tend to lie toward the extremes of the quality measure
(Figure 6).
C Appendix on Fairness
Much recent work on designing the outcomes of decisions has considered adding fairness criteria to the
maximum profit objective. In the setting of group fairness, the population is partitioned into subgroups, and
fairness criteria generally seek to ensure that classifications satisfy a notion of equality (or near-equality)
between these groups. In this section, we demonstrate how fairness constrained profit maximization corresponds
to multiobjective optimization over profit and welfare for a particular definition of welfare.
Consider a population partitioned into subgroups j ∈ Ω and a classifier which has access to the profit
score p of each individual. In this case, we decompose policies over groups such that pi = (pij)j∈Ω and the
fairness-constrained profit maximization is given as
pifair ∈ argmax
pi,β
UP(pi) s.t. E[pij(p) | in group j ∩ C] = βj, |βi − βj| ≤  for all i, j ∈ Ω (12)
where the choice of C encodes particular fairness criteria. For a large class of fairness criteria including
demographic parity and equal opportunity, we can restrict our attention to threshold policies pij(p) = I(p ≥ tj)
where tj are group-dependent thresholds Liu et al. (2018). Notice that due to the definition of profit score (1),
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the unconstrained solution would simply be piMaxUtil(p) = I(p ≥ 0) for all groups. For this reason, we consider
groups with tj < 0 as comparatively disadvantaged (since their threshold increases in the absence of fairness
constraints) and tj > 0 as advantaged.
In this setting, there exist fixed welfare scores w which achieve the same solution policy for any population.
Proposition C.1. Any fairness-constrained threshold policy giving rise to thresholds {t?j }Nj=1 is equivalent to
a set of α-Pareto policies for α ∈ (0, 1) in (2) with welfare scores fixed within each group and defined as
wj = −1− α
α
t?j .
In particular, wj and t
?
j have opposite signs for all settings of α ∈ (0, 1), and any relative scale between them
achieved by some choice of α.
Proof. The equivalence follows by comparing the policies
piα(w, p) = I(αw + (1− α)p ≥ 0) and pifair,j(p) = I(p ≥ t?j ) .
Restricting the choice to a fixed score within each group yields the expression
wj = −1− α
α
t?j =: −ct?j .
Thus we have that wj ∝ −t∗j for all j ∈ {1, ..., N}. Further, notice that for any c > 0 there exists some
α ∈ (0, 1) achieving that c with α = 11+c .
Trade-offs between profit and fairness.
While the result presented above is valid for even inexact fairness constraints, it does not shed light on
the trade-off between profit and fairness as the parameter  varies. We now show how trading off in the
fairness setting can be modeled equivalently by the multi-objective framework. For simplicity, we restrict our
attention to the setting of two groups and criteria of demographic parity. We note that with additional mild
assumptions, our arguments extend naturally to other criteria, including equal opportunity (analogously to
section 6.2 of Liu et al. (2018)).
Define the two groups as A and B. In this section, we assume that the distribution of the profit score p
has continuous support within these populations. The following proposition shows that the that solution to
the constrained profit maximization problem (12) changes monotonically with the fairness parameter .
Proposition C.2. Suppose that the unconstrained selection rate in group A is less than or equal to the
unconstrained selection rate in group B. Then the policies piA, pi

B that optimize eq. (12) with the demographic
parity constraint are equivalent to randomized group-dependent threshold policies with thresholds tA and t

B
satisfying the following:
• tA ≤ 0 for all  ≥ 0 and tA is increasing in  ,
• tB ≥ 0 for all  ≥ 0 and tB is decreasing in  .
Notice that the unconstrained selection rate in group A being less than the unconstrained selection rate
in group B is equivalent to A being disadvantaged compared with B. Thus we see that as  increases, the
group-dependent optimal thresholds shrink toward the unconstrained profit maximizing solution, where
tA = tB = 0. We present the proof of this result in the next section.
We define the map A(p) :=  s.t. t

A = p for p ∈ [t0A, 0]. By Proposition C.2, A(p) in increasing in p.
Using the previous ingredients, we define a policy based on welfare scores which is equivalent to a fair
policy.
Theorem C.3. Under the conditions of Proposition C.2, the family of policies pifair parametrized by 
corresponds to a family of α-Pareto policies solutions for a fixed choice of group-dependent welfare weightings.
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In particular, denoting the associated thresholds as tA and t

B and defining for each individual in A with profit
score p,
wA =
{− p
t
A(p)
B
t0A ≤ p ≤ 0
0 otherwise
and for all individuals in B,
wB =
{
−1 0 ≤ p ≤ t0B
0 otherwise
,
then for each pifair there exists an equivalent α
-Pareto policy piα where the trade-off parameter α
 decreases
in .
Proof. By Proposition C.2, the policy pi is equivalent to a threshold policy with group dependent thresholds
denoted tA and t

B. The group dependent threshold policy I{p ≥ tj } is equivalent to an α-Pareto optimal
policy (for some definition of welfare score w) if and only if for all values of p:
I{p ≥ tj } = I{αw + (1− α)p ≥ 0} .
It is sufficient to restrict our attention to welfare scores w that depend on profit score and group membership,
which we denote as wpj . Starting with group B, we have that for 0 ≤ p ≤ t0B, wpB = −1, so
piα = I{−α + (1− α)p ≥ 0} = I{p ≥ α

1− α } .
Thus, equivalence is achieved for this case if α

1−α = t

B, or equivalently,
α =
tB
1 + tB
. (13)
We will use this definition for α moving forward, and verify that the proposed welfare score definitions work.
We now turn to group A in the case that t0A ≤ p ≤ 0. We have wpA = ptA(p)B , so
piα = I{− t

B
t
A(p)
B
p
1 + tB
+
p
1 + tB
≥ 0} .
Because 1 + tB ≥ 0 and p ≤ 0, the indicator will be one if and only if tB ≥ tA(p)B . By Proposition C.2, this is
true if and only if  ≤ A(p), which is true if any only if tA ≤ tA(p)A = p. This is exactly the condition for
pifair,A, as desired.
Then finally we consider the remaining cases. In the case that p ≤ t0A in A or p ≤ 0 in B, we have that
pifair,j = 0 for all  by Proposition C.2. Then as desired, 0 + (1− α)p ≤ 0 in this case. In the case that p ≥ 0
in A or p ≥ t0B in B, we have that pifair,j = 1 for all . Then as desired, 0 + (1− α)p ≥ 0 in this case.
Finally, we remark on the form of α. By Proposition C.2, tB ≥ 0 and is decreasing in , so α is decreasing
in .
Note that the presented construction of induced welfare scores is not unique. In fact, simply switching
the roles of A and B in the proof verifies the alternate definitions,
wA =
{
1 t0A ≤ p ≤ 0
0 otherwise
, wB =
{− p
t
B(p)
A
0 ≤ p ≤ t0B
0 otherwise
, (14)
in which case we define B(p) to be the value of  such that p = t

B. We further remark that this construction
generalizes in a straightforward manner to multiple groups, where functions similar to B(p) would be defined
for each group.
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Figure 12: Empirical example of how trade-offs between profit and fairness in lending can be equivalently
encoded by a multi-objective framework.
Numerical demonstration.
We demonstrate the induced welfare scores in the context of a credit lending scenario. In this context, we
define the profit score as the expected gain from lending to an individual,
p = u+ · ρ+ u− · (1− ρ) ,
where ρ is the individual’s probability of repayment. For this demonstration, we set u+ = 1 and u− = −4,
indicating that a default is more costly than a repayment.
We estimate a distribution of profit scores using repayment information from a sample of 301,536
TransUnion TransRisk scores from 2003 published by US Federal Reserve (2007), preprocessed by Hardt et al.
(2016)7. In this dataset, a default corresponds to failing to pay a debt for at least 90 days on at least one
account during a 18-24 month period. We consider two race groups: white non-Hispanic (labeled “white” in
figures), and black. Using the empirical data we estimate the distribution of success probabilities by group
and transform this into a distribution over profit scores. The empirical cumulative density functions are
displayed in Figure 12a. In this dataset 12% of the population is black while 88% is white.
We solve the optimization problem (12) using a two dimensional grid over thresholds. Each pair of
thresholds corresponds to an overall profit utility value as well as an acceptance rate difference; these
quantities are used to determine the solution to the constrained maximization. Figure 12b shows the
thresholds (tA, t

B) for various values of . As predicted by Proposition C.2, they are generally shrinking in
magnitude towards p = 0, and the threshold is negative for the black group and positive for the white group.
Due to the discrete support of the empirical distributions, the monotonicity of these thresholds is not perfect.
Lastly, we use these threshold values to compute induced welfare scores using the construction given in
Theorem C.3. Figure 12c shows how welfare scores are assigned depending on group and on profit score. The
fact that a restricted range of individuals have nonzero welfare scores highlights the limitations of fairness
criteria to affect only individuals within a bounded interval of the max profit solution. Figure 12d shows the
welfare weight α, which is generally decreasing in , though not monotonically. We also see the profit/fairness
trade-off.
Technical proofs.
Before presenting more technical proofs and supporting lemmas, we define important quantities. Recall that
demographic parity constrains the selection rates of policies. Define rate function for each group as
rj(pi) = E[pij(p) | in group j]
7 The data is available at https://github.com/fairmlbook/fairmlbook.github.io/tree/master/code/creditscore/data.
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Because we focus on threshold policies, we will equivalently write rj(t) := rj(I(p ≥ t)). This function is
monotonic in the threshold t, and therefore its inverse maps acceptance rates to thresholds which achieve
that rate, i.e. r−1j (β) = tj. Define fA(β) and fB(β) to be components of the objective function in (12) due to
each group, that is,
fj(β) = P{in j}E[p · I{p > r−1j (β)} | in j] .
By Proposition 5.3 in Liu et al. (2018), the functions fj are concave. Therefore, the combined objective
function is concave in each argument,
UP(βA, βB) :=
∑
j∈{A,B}
P{in j}E[p · I{p > r−1j (βj)} | in j] =
∑
j∈{A,B}
fj(βj) . (15)
We restrict our attention to the case that p has continuous support. In this case, the functions fj are
differentiable.
Lemma C.4. If the distribution of exact profit scores for groups A and B are such that that maximum profit
selection rates βMaxUtilA = rA(0) and β
MaxUtil
B = rB(0) and rA(0) ≤ rA(0), then for any  ≥ 0, the selection rates
maximizing the optimization problem (12) under demographic parity satisfy the following:
βMaxUtilA ≤ βA ≤ βB ≤ βMaxUtilB .
Proof of Lemma C.4. First, note we must have that βA ≤ βMaxUtilB . If it were that βA > βMaxUtilB , then the
alternate solution βA = β
MaxUtil
B and βB = β
MaxUtil
B would be feasible for (12) and achieve a higher objective
value by the concavity of (15).
Then we show that βB ≤ βMaxUtilB . Assume for the sake of contradiction that βB > βMaxUtilB . Then since
βA ≤ βMaxUtilB , setting βB = βMaxUtilB achieves higher objective value without increasing |βB − βA|, and thus
would be feasible for (12). A similar argument shows that βA ≥ βMaxUtilA .
Then, we show that for any optimal selection rates, βA ≤ βB for all  ≥ 0. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that βA > β

B. In this case, we can equivalently write that
βMaxUtilB − βB > βMaxUtilB − βA and/or βA − βMaxUtilA > βB − βMaxUtilA .
In either case, setting βA = β

B would be a feasible solution which would achieve a higher objective function
value, by the concavity of (15). This contradicts the assumption that βA > β

B, and thus it must be that
βA ≤ βB.
Lemma C.5. Under the conditions of Lemma C.4, the maximizer (βA, β

B) of the -demographic parity
constrained problem in (12) is either satisfied with the maximum profit selection rates (βMaxUtilA , β
MaxUtil
B ), or
βB − βA =  (or the two conditions coincide).
Proof of Lemma C.5. If it were that |βA − βB| = γ <  then we could construct an alternative solution using
the remaining − γ slack in the constraint which would achieve a higher objective function value, since the
functions fj are concave. Furthermore, by Lemma C.4, we have that |βA − βB| = βB − βA .
This result implies that the complexity of the maximization (12) can be reduced to a single variable
search:
β? = argmax
β
fA(β) + fB(β + ), pi

fair = (I{p ≥ r−1j (β?)}, I(p ≥ r−1j (β? + )}) (16)
This expression holds when |βMaxUtilA − βMaxUtilB | > , and otherwise the solution is given by (βMaxUtilA , βMaxUtilB )
.
Lemma C.6. Under the conditions of Lemma C.4, as  ≥ 0 decreases, the group-dependent selection rates
βA and β

B become closer to the profit maximizing selection rates for each group. That is, the functions
|βA − βMaxUtilA | and |βB − βMaxUtilB | are both increasing in .
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Proof of Lemma C.6. We show that for any ′ ≥  ≥ 0, it must be that |βj −βMaxUtilj | ≤ |β
′
j −βMaxUtilj |. First,
we remark that if |βMaxUtilA − βMaxUtilB | ≤  or if  ≤ |βMaxUtilA − βMaxUtilB | ≤ ′, the claim holds by application
of Lemma C.4.
Otherwise, let the -demographic parity constrained solution be optimized by (β, β + ) and the ′-
demographic parity constrained solution be optimized by (β′, β′+′). This is valid by Lemma C.5. Equivalently,
β ∈ argmax{fA(β) + fB(β + )} and β′ ∈ argmax{fA(β′) + fB(β′ + ′)}. Since fA and fB are concave and
differentiable,
f ′A(β) + f
′
B(β + ) = 0 and f
′
A(β
′) + f ′B(β
′ + ′) = 0 .
Assume for sake of contradiction that β < β′ and recall that by Lemma C.4 we further have β′ > β ≥
βMaxUtilA , so by the concavity of fA,
fA(β) ≥ fA(β′) and f ′A(β′) ≤ f ′A(β) .
Analogously, we must have that βMaxUtilB ≥ β′ + ′ > β + , so that
fB(β
′ + ′) ≥ fB(β + ) and f ′B(β′ + ′) ≥ f ′B(β + ) .
Using the equations above, we have that
f ′B(β + ) = −f ′A(β)
≤ −f ′A(β′)
= f ′B(β
′ + ′)
Since fB is concave and thus its derivative is decreasing, this statement implies that β +  ≥ β′ + ′, which is
a contradiction. Thus, it must be that β ≥ β′, i.e. βA ≥ β
′
A . With an analogous proof by contradiction, one
can show that β
′
B ≥ βB.
Combining these two inequalities in Lemma C.4 completes the proof of Lemma C.6.
Proof of Proposition C.2. The proof makes use of Lemma C.4 and Lemma C.6.
First, we show that tA ≤ 0 for all  ≥ 0. This is a consequence of Lemma C.4, which shows that
βA ≥ βMaxUtilA . Since rA is a decreasing function (and thus, r−1A is also a decreasing function), this implies that
tA = r
−1
A (β

A) ≤ r−1A (βMaxUtilA ) = 0
A similar argument holds to show that tB ≥ 0 for all  ≥ 0.
Now we show that tA is increasing in  and t

B is decreasing in  to show that both are shrinking toward 0
as  increases. Since tj = r
−1
j (β) is decreasing in β, Lemma C.6 implies that the functions |tA| = |tA− tMaxUtilA |
and |tB| = |tB − tMaxUtilB | are also decreasing in  toward the max profit thresholds of tMaxUtilA = tMaxUtilB = 0.
Since tA ≤ 0 and tB ≥ 0 for all  ≥ 0, this concludes the proof of Proposition C.2.
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